Climate change Social divisions in belief and behaviour by Fisher, S. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Fisher, S., Fitzgerald, R. and Poortinga, W. (2018). Climate change Social 
divisions in belief and behaviour. In: Phillips, D., Curtice, J., Phillips, M. and Perry, J. (Eds.), 
British Social Attitudes: The 35th Report. . London: The National Centre for Social Research. 
ISBN 9781527225916 
This is the published version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/21046/
Link to published version: 
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
The National Centre for Social Research
British Social Attitudes 35 | Climate change 1
Views on existence, causes and consequences of climate change, by age
As a global problem, climate change affects everyone. But within Britain opinion is divided. This 
chapter asks to what extent people in Britain believe humans cause climate change, think it is 
a problem, and feel that citizens and governments are likely to be able to reduce it. Also, what 
are the main social divisions in attitudes to climate change, and how much does opinion differ 
between supporters of different political parties?
Spotlight 
Most people believe climate change is happening but far fewer believe it is mainly caused by 
humans or are worried about it. Older people are comparatively less worried and think that the 
consequences will not be so bad.
Climate change 
Social divisions in beliefs and behaviour
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Overview
Most think climate change is at least partly caused by 
humans
The vast majority acknowledge a human component in climate change, but relatively few 
agree with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) conclusion that it is 
mainly caused by humans.
• 95% think climate change is at least partly due to human activity when asked about relative 
contributions of human and natural causes.
• 36% say climate change is “mainly” or “entirely” due to human activity.
• 53% think human and natural causes are equally to blame.
• Just 2% claim that climate change definitely is not happening. 
Young and educated are more worried about climate 
change
Older and less educated people are less worried about climate change and think that the 
consequences will not be so bad.
• 31% of 18-34 year olds are “very” or “extremely” worried about climate change compared with 
just 19% of over-65s. 
• 35% of graduates are “very” or “extremely” worried about climate change compared with just 
20% among those without any educational qualifications above GCSE level.
• These findings reflect similar age and education patterns as found when analysing views on the 
extent to which climate change is happening and is caused by human activity. 
Lack of optimism about reducing climate change
Respondents assessed the chances of reducing climate change on a number of dimensions, 
using a scale from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (extremely likely).  
• On average people give a 4.4 score for the chances that limiting their own energy use would 
reduce climate change. 
• On average people give a 5.8 score for the chances that climate change would be reduced if 
large numbers of people reduced their energy use. 
• On average people give a 3.8 score for the chances that large numbers of people will actually 
limit their energy use.
• On average people give a score of 4.3 for the chances that governments in enough countries 
will take action that reduces climate change.
The National Centre for Social Research
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Introduction 
Climate change is arguably one of the most pressing challenges the 
world is currently facing. The burning of fossil fuels, in combination 
with other human activities, has significantly altered the heat balance 
of the earth’s atmosphere. This poses serious risks for both human 
and natural systems across the world (IPCC, 2014). As climate 
change is a global problem, it also requires global collaboration to 
address it. The Paris agreement, adopted by global consensus at 
the end of 2015, sets out to reduce the threats of climate change 
by keeping the global temperature rise well below 2 degrees 
Celsius above pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit the 
temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015).
Policy action that different governments may take is however likely 
to be dependent on public perceptions in their countries – they may 
be less willing to take action if the electorate are not concerned 
or do not believe that climate change is happening. Since there is 
widespread scientific consensus that manmade climate change 
is happening (Cook et al., 2016), there should be little room for 
differences of opinion. So a central question this chapter will address 
is the extent to which the British public has a united view on climate 
change.
Previous evidence suggests there are a number of social divisions 
in attitudes to climate change (Poortinga et al , 2011; Whitmarsh, 
2011; Taylor, 2012). While overall levels of climate scepticism appear 
to be low, there are clear differences in attitudes in terms of sex, 
age, and education. Climate change is largely about long-run trends 
in global temperatures, and is not simply reflected in day-to-day 
experiences of the weather. It is likely that those who have had 
more formal education are more likely to know about it – either from 
having learnt about it directly at school and university, or from active 
engagement with current affairs fostered by their education. Given 
that climate change only started to attract widespread attention from 
the public from the late 1980s onwards, and evidence of its existence 
and consequences has mounted since then, there may well be age 
differences in attitudes to and concern about the issue. While older 
generations grew up without any mention of climate change, younger 
generations have been taught about it in school and have heard 
about it in mainstream media (news and entertainment) for a longer 
period of their lives.
As evidence of climate change has mounted over time, so demands 
for mitigation policies have grown stronger. However, moves to 
tax and restrict carbon emissions have been resisted by some 
organisations. Political divisions over climate change and the 
environment may have been fuelled by sceptical coverage in the 
English-speaking media (Painter & Ashe, 2012) and campaigns to 
sow doubt in the public’s mind about the existence and importance 
of climate change (Oreskes & Conway, 2010); but also by a dislike of 
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the solutions rather than of the issue itself (Campbell & Kay, 2014). 
The gap in concern about climate change between Republicans 
and Democrats in the US has been widely reported in the literature 
(Dunlap et al., 2016). Although political divisions have also been 
found in Europe and the UK, they tend to be much smaller than in the 
US (McCright et al., 2016). 
Indeed, differences between Conservative, Labour and Liberal 
Democrat voters on this topic have been found to be modest 
in previous British Social Attitudes (BSA) surveys (Taylor, 2012). 
Although Poortinga and colleagues (2011) reported that people 
who are politically disengaged were less likely to think that climate 
change is real, more recently Britain has seen the rise of the climate-
sceptic UK Independence Party (UKIP), as well as the 2016 EU 
membership referendum which mobilised previously disengaged 
citizens (Curtice, 2017). As Curtice and Tipping discuss in the Europe 
chapter, the politics of Brexit has profoundly shaped how citizens 
divide themselves politically; and that process of political sorting may 
well have had consequences for the extent to which supporters of 
different political parties hold different opinions on the environment, 
and climate change in particular. It is therefore an appropriate 
moment to re-assess public attitudes to climate change, and how 
they may vary across social groups.
In this chapter, we investigate the nature and extent of social and 
political divisions in attitudes to climate change. We use data from 
the European Social Survey (ESS), the European sister survey to the 
BSA series. The ESS is a biennial survey that has been conducted 
since 2002. Each round contains two modules on key social themes. 
Round 8 of the ESS included a module on Climate Change and 
Energy, with interviews conducted by the National Centre for Social 
Research (NatCen) in late 2016 and early 20171. 
We discuss beliefs about the existence, causes and consequences 
of climate change, before moving on to individual feelings regarding 
the issue, including feelings of worry, responsibility and willingness to 
limit personal energy use. This is followed by an analysis of political 
divisions on climate change opinion in the context of Brexit. 
Beliefs about climate change
Thoughts about climate change
Given that climate change is a long-standing and major 
environmental problem, people may well be expected to have given 
it some thought. When respondents are asked “how much have you 
1  Unlike the BSA series which draws a representative sample of those aged 18 years 
and over, the ESS draws a representative sample of the UK population aged 16 years and over. 
In order to help comparison with the BSA survey, respondents aged 16-17 and those resident in 
Northern Ireland are excluded from the analysis. The data were weighted to account for the way 
the respondents were randomly selected, and so that the distributions of age, sex, and region 
correspond to those in the Labour Force Survey. This means that the resulting sample can be 
considered broadly representative.
The National Centre for Social Research
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thought about climate change before today?”, the most popular 
answer is “some” (39%). Table 1 shows that a further 39% say either 
“a lot” or “a great deal”. 
We explore divisions by age and education here and elsewhere in 
the chapter, firstly because these have been highlighted as being 
important social divisions (Poortinga et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2011; 
Taylor, 2012) and secondly because regression analyses, that are not 
shown but inform this chapter2, indicate that they are more important 
and consistent determinants than factors such as sex, income, 
religion and ethnicity3.
When we look at the different age and education groups, we see that 
a majority (56%) of graduates say they have given climate change a 
lot or a great deal of thought4. People with lower levels of education 
are increasingly less likely to say that they have done so (36% for 
participants with an intermediate qualification5, and 27% for those 
with GCSE or lower). Despite being more likely than older groups to 
have grown up hearing about climate change, younger age groups 
generally do not report having thought about it more. Overall, while 
people may not have thought much about climate change they do 
seem to have thought about it enough to have an opinion on whether 
it is happening and be aware of whether or not it is a problem caused 
by human activity.
Table 1 How much people have thought about climate change before today, by age and 
education level
Age group Highest education level
18-34 35-64 65+
GCSE 
or lower
Intermediate Degree All
Thought about 
climate change
% % % % % % %
A great deal 11 12 12 7 9 21 12
A lot 27 30 23 20 27 36 27
Some 37 40 40 39 43 33 39
Very little 18 16 19 25 18 9 17
Not at all 6 2 5 8 3 2 4
Unweighted base 392 893 540 607 736 515 1858
Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+
Answer options are presented in the table in reverse order to how they were presented to 
respondents
2   Regression analysis output is available from the authors on request.
3   To save space, our tables divide people into three groups for each of age and education. 
There are still further divisions within these groups, but they follow essentially the same pattern 
(Barasi and Harding, 2017). 
4 Figures reported in the main text body that combine two or more categories from a table 
are calculated from the exact data, rather than the rounded figures that appear in the table. As a 
result, these figures will sometimes vary from the sum of the rounded figures by +/-1%.
5   This category includes those without a degree but with, for example, a nursing 
certificate, BTEC, HNC, A and AS-levels, Vocational A-levels, apprenticeship or other equivalent 
qualifications above GSCE level.
A majority (56%) of 
graduates say they 
have given climate 
change a lot or a great 
deal of thought
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Existence of climate change
Table 2 shows that the vast majority of people think that the world’s 
climate is, at least probably, changing (93%). Less than 2% report 
that they think the world’s climate is definitely not changing; and 
an additional 5% that climate change is probably not happening. 
Scepticism regarding the existence of climate change is very rare, 
both overall and in the different age and education groups.
Given the overwhelming scientific consensus on climate change, 
it might be considered surprising that still 39% are not fully sure 
that the world’s climate is changing. The extent to which people are 
convinced is greater among younger and more educated people. But 
even among graduates and under-35s, only two-thirds are definite 
that climate change is happening. Among the over-65s and those 
with GCSE, equivalent or lower educational attainment, only half 
think that the world’s climate is changing.
Table 2 Views on whether the world’s climate is changing, by age and education level
Age group Highest education level
18-34 35-64 65+
GCSE 
or 
Lower
Intermediate Degree All
Climate is … % % % % % % %
… definitely changing 66 63 50 50 63 68 61
… probably changing 28 30 40 40 31 25 32
… probably not changing 5 4 7 6 5 5 5
… definitely not changing 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
Unweighted base 392 893 540 607 736 515 1858
Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+
Causes of climate change
Successive reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) have become increasingly confident that there is 
a clear human influence on the global climate. Their most recent 
report emphasises that the warming of the climate is unequivocal, 
and that it is extremely likely that more than half of the observed 
increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 
was caused by humans (IPCC, 2014). Table 3 shows that when 
asking respondents whether they “think that climate change is 
caused by natural processes, human activity or both”, only about a 
third (36%) say that climate change is mainly or entirely caused by 
human activity. Most people think humans and natural causes are 
equally responsible. While the vast majority (95%) think that climate 
change is at least in part caused by human activity, it is equally true 
that a large majority (93%) think that climate change is at least partly 
The vast majority of 
people think that the 
world’s climate is 
changing (93%)
Only about a third 
(36%) say that climate 
change is mainly or 
entirely caused by 
human activity
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due to natural processes. By contrast, the IPCC’s best estimate is 
that the human contribution to global warming is about the same as 
the actual observed global warming. On this basis, humans are not 
just mainly but entirely responsible. Perhaps because this estimate 
has not been effectively communicated, only 4% think that climate 
change is entirely due to humans; although, total scepticism about 
human involvement in creating climate change is, at 2%, also 
extremely rare. 
Table 3 Views about whether climate change is caused by natural processes, 
human activity or both, by age and education level
Age group Highest education level
18-34 35-64 65+
GCSE 
or 
Lower
Interme-
diate
Degree All
Cause of climate 
change
% % % % % % %
Entirely by human 
activity
7 3 3 5 3 5 4
Mainly by human 
activity
39 32 24 23 29 43 32
Equally human 
activity and 
natural processes
44 54 58 58 55 43 53
Mainly by natural 
processes
6 7 8 7 7 6 7
Entirely by natural 
processes
2 2 4 3 3 1 2
Definitely not 
happening
1 2 1 3 1 1 2
Unweighted base 392 893 540 607 736 515 1858
Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+
Answer options are presented in the table in reverse order to how they were presented to 
respondents
Younger people and graduates are more likely to say that climate 
change is mainly or entirely due to human activity, but even among 
graduates and the under-35s, this is not a majority viewpoint. 
Meanwhile, for the over-65s and the least educated, only 27% think 
climate change is mainly or entirely caused by human activity. 
Consequences of climate change
If people do not appreciate that climate change is caused by 
humans, this might also be expected to affect the extent to which 
people think that climate change is a problem or not. The ESS asked 
people how good or bad they thought climate change would be 
for people around the world. The 2% who think the world’s climate 
The National Centre for Social Research
British Social Attitudes 35 | Climate change 8
is “definitely not changing” were not asked this and subsequent 
questions about climate change, apart from those on policy 
preferences in Table 146. 
Respondents were asked to give a score from 0, meaning extremely 
bad, to 10, meaning extremely good, to indicate what they thought 
the impact of climate change “will be on people across the world”. 
Two-thirds (66%) of those who gave any score gave one on the 
bad side 0-4, 18% said 5 (suggesting perhaps they thought it will 
be neutral or that they don’t know), and 16% gave a score of 6-10 
– suggesting that they think that climate change has net positive 
consequences for humans.
Table 4 reports the mean scores for the perceived consequences of 
climate change “on people across the world” (full question text is 
available in the appendix to this chapter), according to different age 
and education groups. It is clear that, in line with their stronger beliefs 
in the existence of human-caused climate change, younger and more 
educated groups think that the consequences of climate change will 
be worse than older and less educated groups do. The age divide is 
particularly apparent among graduates (although caution needs to 
be applied, given the small sample size for the oldest age group) but 
less apparent within the group with the lowest levels of education. 
Table 4 Average scores for how good or bad people think the impact of climate change will 
be on people across the world, by age and education level
Highest education level
Mean of extremely bad (0) 
to extremely good (10)
GCSE or 
Lower
Intermediate Degree All
All 4.0 3.6 2.9 3.5
Unweighted base 590 724 507 1821
Age Group
18-34 3.8 3.4 2.4 3.2
Unweighted base 90 185 113 388
35-64 3.9 3.7 3.0 3.5
Unweighted base 215 361 295 871
65+ 4.3 3.8 3.6 4.0
Unweighted base 267 174 91 532
Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+
As we’ve seen in this section, the average person in Britain has 
given “some” thought to climate change. Most think that the world’s 
climate is “definitely” changing, and there is also a majority who hold 
the view that climate change is “about equally” caused by human 
activity and natural processes. On average, adults in Britain think that 
the impact of climate change for people around the world will only 
6  Since there were only a few that chose this option, their exclusion makes little difference 
to the conclusions of our analyses.
Younger and more 
educated groups think 
the consequences of 
climate change will be 
worse than older and 
less educated groups
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be slightly on the bad side. This is a combination of opinions that 
suggests the average person in Britain accepts that climate change is 
a problem created by humans, but not a terribly damaging one. 
Personal responses to climate change
In this section we consider how people respond to climate change, 
both in how they feel about it and in their personal behaviour. 
Worry about climate change
The ESS asked respondents, “how worried are you about climate 
change?” Responses are shown in Table 5. The most popular 
response was “somewhat worried” (45%). Just over a quarter are not 
at all or not very worried (28%), and a quarter are very or extremely 
worried (25%). There is a very similar pattern of responses to a 
related question asking, “How worried are you that energy may be 
too expensive for many people in Britain?”. In fact, more people say 
they are very or extremely worried about the cost of energy (36%) 
than about climate change (25%).
More people say they 
are very or extremely 
worried about the 
cost of energy (36%) 
than about climate 
change (25%)
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Table 5 Levels of worry about climate change, by age, education level, and climate change 
beliefs
Age group Highest education level
18-34 35-64 65+
GCSE 
or 
Lower
Inter-
mediate
Degree 
Level of worry % % % % % %
Extremely worried 7 5 6 5 4 9
Very worried 25 18 14 15 17 27
Somewhat worried 42 47 45 45 49 41
Not very worried 19 22 26 23 25 17
Not at all worried 6 5 8 9 4 6
Climate change not happening 1 2 1 3 1 1
Unweighted base 392 893 540 607 736 515
Beliefs about 
climate change
Climate 
change 
entirely 
/mainly 
human
Climate 
change 
not 
entirely 
/mainly 
human
All
Level of worry % % %
Extremely worried 11 3 6
Very worried 32 12 19
Somewhat worried 43 46 45
Not very worried 11 29 22
Not at all worried 3 7 6
Climate change not happening - 3 2
Unweighted base 648 1210 1858
Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+
Answer options are presented in the table in reverse order to how they were presented to 
respondents
The greatest differences between groups are evident when you 
compare those saying “very” or “extremely” worried. Younger age 
groups and graduates are more likely to be worried about climate 
change, partly because they are more likely to believe in the existence 
of human-driven climate change. As Table 5 shows, those who think 
that climate change is mainly or entirely caused by humans are more 
worried. However, even among people with this view, only 42% 
indicate being very or extremely worried about climate change. 18-
34 year olds and graduates are the age and educational groups that 
are most worried; in both cases around a third say they are very or 
extremely worried by climate change. 
Those who think that 
climate change is mainly 
or entirely caused 
by humans are most 
worried by it
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Feeling personal responsibility to reduce climate 
change
As well as differing in how worried they are about climate change, 
people may also feel different levels of personal responsibility to 
try to reduce climate change. Table 6 shows the average scores on 
a scale of personal responsibility for helping with climate change 
mitigation, where 0 means no responsibility and 10 means feeling 
a great deal of responsibility (full question wording can be found in 
the appendix to this chapter). The overall average score is 6.0, only 
slightly above the mid-point of 5. Responses are quite spread out 
across the scale, with scores from 5 to 8 being the most popular. 
Less than 10% give a score of 2 or less and 15% a score of 9 or 
10. While most scores are above 5, they are also clustered around 
intermediate levels, suggesting that people only feel a moderate 
personal responsibility to help reduce climate change.
Table 6 Average score for extent to which people feel personal responsibility to reduce 
climate change, by age, education level and climate change beliefs
Highest education level Beliefs about climate change
Mean of not at all 
responsible (0) 
to a great deal 
responsible (10)
GCSE 
or lower
Inter-
mediate
Degree 
Climate 
change 
entirely /
mainly human
Climate 
change not 
entirely /
mainly human
All
All 5.4 6.0 6.7 6.8 5.6 6.0
Unweighted base 576 723 505 646 1158 1804
Age Group
18-34 5.2 5.6 6.6 6.7 5.1 5.8
Unweighted base 88 185 112 169 216 385
35-64 5.7 6.2 6.8 7.0 5.9 6.3
Unweighted base 208 361 295 326 538 864
65+ 5.3 6.0 6.4 6.6 5.4 5.7
Unweighted base 264 173 90 147 385 527
Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+
Responses to the question of personal responsibility are strongly 
linked to beliefs about the causes of climate change. Those who 
think climate change is mainly or entirely caused by humans feel 
more personally responsible for trying to mitigate it. Furthermore, 
as shown in Table 6, the more educated people are, the more likely 
they are to believe that climate change is mainly caused by humans, 
and thus the more likely to feel some sense of responsibility for 
resolving the problem. However, even after using regression analysis 
(not shown) to account for the correlation between education and 
beliefs about the causes of climate change, education still has an 
additional impact on feelings of responsibility. Also, while younger 
People only feel a 
moderate personal 
responsibility 
to help reduce 
climate change
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people are more likely to believe in human responsibility for climate 
change, there is no correlation between age and feelings of personal 
responsibility for climate change mitigation. As Table 6 shows, 
reported feelings of personal responsibility among those who believe 
that climate change is entirely or mainly due to humans, and among 
those who do not, show a similar pattern across the different age 
groups (for example, the 35-64 year-old age group felt the highest 
level of personal responsibility across both of these groups). Beliefs 
about the causes of climate change only explain a small part of the 
differences in feelings of personal responsibility we observe.
Limiting personal energy use
Before introducing any questions about climate change, the ESS 
asked respondents how often they do things to reduce their energy 
use in their daily life, “such as switching off appliances that are not 
being used, walking for short journeys, or only using the heating 
or air conditioning when really needed.” The median response was 
that they “often” do things to reduce energy use, and just under half 
(47%) said they do so “very often” or “always”.
If beliefs and concerns about climate change motivate efforts 
to save energy, then we would expect to see younger and more 
educated people reporting doing things to save energy more often. 
Table 7 shows that the under 35s, rather than doing the most, are 
particularly less likely to say that they do things to save energy. Since 
they are more likely to live with their parents, or otherwise in shared 
accommodation, they might have less opportunity than over 35s 
to save energy. However, in response to a hypothetical question in 
the ESS, young people are also less likely to say they would buy an 
energy efficient appliance7. 
7 The ESS question read, “If you were to buy a large electrical appliance for your 
home, how likely is it that you would buy one of the most energy efficient (in the sense of ‘using 
less energy) ones?” Responses were on a scale of 0 meaning “Not at all likely” to 10 meaning 
“Extremely likely”.
The National Centre for Social Research
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Table 7 Frequency of limiting personal energy use, by age, education level and climate 
change beliefs
Age group Highest education level
18-34 35-64 65+ GCSE or 
Lower
Interme-
diate
Degree
Frequency of limiting 
personal energy use
% % % % % %
Always 15 19 15 17 17 18
Very often 27 31 32 27 28 35
Often 29 27 28 27 31 26
Sometimes 24 18 19 21 20 18
Hardly ever 3 4 4 5 3 3
Never 2 1 2 2 1 *
Cannot reduce energy * * * * * 0
Unweighted base 392 893 540 607 736 515
Beliefs about 
climate change
Climate 
change 
entirely 
/mainly 
human
Climate 
change 
not 
entirely 
/mainly 
human
All
Frequency of limiting 
personal energy use
% % %
Always 18 17 17
Very often 32 29 30
Often 26 29 28
Sometimes 18 20 20
Hardly ever 4 4 4
Never 2 1 1
Cannot reduce energy * * *
Unweighted base 648 1210 1858
Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+
It is not just with respect to age that the social divisions in beliefs 
and concerns about climate change do not translate into differences 
in personal action. Efforts to save energy only modestly increase 
with level of education. Part of the issue here is that energy-saving 
behaviours are only moderately linked to beliefs about climate 
change. Table 7 shows only a slight tendency towards saving 
energy more often for those who believe climate change is mainly or 
entirely caused by humans. Indeed, this tendency is only statistically 
significant for those who believe climate change is entirely, not just 
Those who believe 
climate change is 
mainly or entirely 
caused by humans 
show only a 
modest tendency 
towards saving 
energy more often 
than other groups
The National Centre for Social Research
British Social Attitudes 35 | Climate change 14
mainly, the result of human activity (regression analysis not shown). 
Personal decisions about energy use are affected by a variety of 
other factors; and ambitions to mitigate climate change may only be 
one of them.
Personal efficacy
One of the reasons why beliefs and worry about climate change 
may not necessarily translate into action could be that some people 
think that whatever action they themselves could take may not make 
a difference. Table 8 confirms that people are not convinced that 
reducing the amount of energy they use would be effective. When 
asked “how likely (on a scale from 0 meaning “not at all likely” to 10 
meaning “extremely likely”) do you think it is that limiting your own 
energy use would help reduce climate change?” the average score is 
4.4. This is below the mid-point, suggesting a low level of confidence 
in personal efficacy.
Table 8 Views on likelihood that limiting own energy use would help reduce climate change, 
by age, education and climate change beliefs
Highest education level Beliefs about climate change
Mean from not 
at all likely (0) to 
extremely likely 
(10)
GCSE 
or 
lower
Inter-
mediate
Degree
Climate 
change 
entirely /
mainly human
Climate 
change not 
entirely /mainly 
human
All
All 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.7 4.2 4.4
Unweighted base 576 716 506 642 1156 1798
Age Group
18-34 4.3 4.1 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.3
Unweighted base 89 183 112 167 217 384
35-64 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.9 4.4 4.6
Unweighted base 210 359 295 326 538 864
65+ 4.2 4.2 3.5 4.7 3.9 4.1
Unweighted base 262 170 91 145 378 523
Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+
Table 8 shows that feelings of personal efficacy do not follow the 
same age and education patterns as for climate change beliefs and 
concerns. Feelings of efficacy are slightly greater among graduates 
than those with less educational attainment, but only among those 
of working age. Graduates over 65 have the lowest average scores 
of all the groups in the table – although we should be cautious about 
this finding, given the small sample size involved. Overall, with regard 
to age, those aged 35-64 have the highest level of personal efficacy, 
followed by those aged 18-34. 
People are not 
convinced that reducing 
the amount of energy 
they use would be 
effective in reducing 
climate change
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Feelings of personal efficacy are greater for those who believe that 
climate change is mainly or entirely due to humans than for those 
who think that natural processes play an equal or greater part. But 
that relationship is fairly weak. Table 8 shows only a 0.5 average 
difference. So it is not surprising that social divisions in feelings 
regarding personal efficacy do not necessarily follow the same 
pattern as those for climate change beliefs and concerns. We can’t 
be sure why we observe this pattern; it may be that the weak linkage 
between beliefs about the causes of climate change and feelings 
of personal efficacy depends on a deeper attitude or set of values 
regarding personal efficacy.
Overall, these findings reveal that, on average people in Britain are 
only “somewhat worried” about climate change, and they do not 
feel a strong sense of personal responsibility to try to reduce it. 
Although people on average do not strongly feel that by reducing 
their own energy use they can help reduce climate change, they do 
report “often” doing things to save energy, but not necessarily in an 
attempt to reduce climate change. The consistent age and education 
gaps that were observed for beliefs and worry about climate change, 
do not extend to feelings of responsibility, efficacy, and, perhaps 
most importantly, energy-saving behaviour. On these variables, the 
education gap is smaller and a different pattern emerges with respect 
to age. Even if the young are more likely to believe and to be worried 
about climate change, it is the 35-64 year olds who feel the most 
responsible and efficacious, and report reducing their energy use the 
most often.
Climate change as a collective issue
Climate change is a global challenge. As a result, climate change 
mitigation is not only a matter of individuals acting alone; it is hard 
to imagine a solution without both people acting collectively and 
government intervention. This section considers the extent to which 
people feel climate change might be addressed by either.
Collective efficacy on climate change
Before asking about the prospects for collective action, the ESS 
asked a question designed to capture the extent to which people 
believe that large-scale collective action by individuals would actually 
reduce climate change. Specifically, it asked, “Now imagine that large 
numbers of people limited their energy use. How likely do you think it 
is that this would reduce climate change?” Responses are on a scale 
from 0 meaning “not at all likely” to 10 meaning “extremely likely”. 
The distribution of scores is fairly similar to the one for the question 
on personal efficacy, but with a slightly higher average overall. 
Naturally enough, people think that lots of people limiting their energy 
use will have more effect than just one person doing so. However, 
while the average score for collective efficacy (5.8) is clearly higher 
On average, people 
in Britain are only 
“somewhat worried” 
about climate change, 
and do not feel a strong 
sense of personal 
responsibility to try to 
reduce it
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than that for personal efficacy (4.4), it is surprising that the gap is not 
much wider. 
Table 9 shows that younger people are much more likely to think that 
large numbers of people limiting energy use would be effective. By 
contrast, responses are not consistently associated with education 
since there are different patterns by education within the different age 
groups. However, there is a modest difference in responses between 
men and women, with women reporting a greater sense of collective 
efficacy (6.0) than men (5.6). Also, the more someone thinks that 
climate change is due to humans, the more they think humans can 
collectively do something about it.
Table 9 Views about likelihood that large numbers of people limiting their energy use would 
reduce climate change, by age, education level and climate change beliefs
Highest education level Beliefs about climate change
Mean from not 
at all likely (0) to 
extremely likely 
(10)
GCSE 
or 
lower
Inter-
mediate
Degree
Climate 
change entirely 
/mainly human
Climate 
change not 
entirely /
mainly human
All
All 5.7 5.7 6.0 6.4 5.4 5.8
Unweighted base 570 712 504 638 1148 1786
Age Group
18-34 5.9 5.9 6.3 6.6 5.5 6.0
Unweighted base 87 178 112 165 212 377
35-64 5.8 5.7 6.0 6.4 5.5 5.8
Unweighted base 209 360 293 326 536 862
65+ 5.4 5.5 5.4 6.1 5.2 5.4
Unweighted base 261 170 91 144 378 522
Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+
Will large numbers of people limit their energy use?
Having asked a hypothetical question about the potential 
effectiveness of collective action, the ESS asked respondents how 
they rate the chances of large numbers of people actually limiting 
their energy use. Specifically, the question was, “How likely do you 
think it is that large numbers of people will actually limit their energy 
use to try to reduce climate change?” Table 10 shows that the 
average answer on a scale from 0 meaning “not at all likely” to 10 
meaning “extremely likely” is 3.8, well below the scale mid-point of 5. 
Overall, people are not terribly optimistic that lots of people will take 
it upon themselves to reduce their energy consumption in a collective 
effort against climate change. 
Younger people are 
much more likely to 
think that large numbers 
of people limiting  
energy use would be 
effective in reducing 
climate change
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Table 10 Views about likelihood that large numbers of people will limit their energy use to 
reduce climate change, by age, education level and climate change beliefs
Highest education level Beliefs about climate change
Mean from not 
at all likely (0) to 
extremely likely 
(10)
GCSE 
or 
lower
Interme-
diate
Degree
Climate 
change entirely 
/mainly human
Climate change 
not entirely /
mainly human
All
All 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.8
Unweighted base 574 717 505 641 1155 1796
Age Group
18-34 3.7 3.3 3.7 3.4 3.5 3.5
Unweighted base 89 180 112 166 215 381
35-64 4.2 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.8
Unweighted base 209 360 294 326 537 854
65+ 4.1 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.0
Unweighted base 263 173 91 146 381 598
Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+
Despite having the most positive view of collective action, young 
people and graduates are relatively more pessimistic about whether 
humans will fulfil this potential. Overall, differences between age 
groups and those with different levels of education explain little of the 
variation in expectations on this issue. Similarly, there is only a very 
weak relationship between views about the causes of climate change 
and expectations for collective action. If anything, the more someone 
thinks that climate change is the result of human activity the more 
pessimistic they are about the prospects of large numbers of people 
limiting their energy use in an attempt to mitigate climate change, but 
that correlation is not statistically significant. 
Will governments in enough countries take action?
If individuals are thought unlikely to take much action, then maybe 
people in Britain expect governments to intervene instead. The ESS 
asked “How likely do you think it is that governments in enough 
countries will take action that reduces climate change?”. This 
question elicited slightly more positive responses than the previous 
question on the same scale of 0 “not at all likely” to 10 “extremely 
likely”. The average (4.3) is only just above the average for the 
response regarding the chances of large numbers of people limiting 
their energy use (3.8), but still below the scale mid-point of 5. A score 
of 4.3 indicates relatively little faith that sufficient governments will 
take action to reduce climate change. Table 11 shows that average 
expectation does not systematically differ by age, education or even 
beliefs in human-driven climate change.
People have 
relatively little 
faith that sufficient 
governments will 
take action to reduce 
climate change
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Table 11 Views about likelihood that governments in enough countries will take action that 
reduces climate change, by age, education level and climate change beliefs
Highest education level Beliefs about climate change
Mean from not 
at all likely (0) to 
extremely likely 
(10)
GCSE 
or lower
Inter-
mediate
Degree
Climate 
change entirely 
/mainly human
Climate change 
not entirely /
mainly human
All
All 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.3
Unweighted base 562 711 504 637 1140 1777
Age Group
18-34 4.4 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.2
Unweighted base 85 179 112 166 210 376
35-64 4.5 4.2 4.4 4.2 4.4 4.3
Unweighted base 207 360 293 325 535 860
65+ 4.4 4.6 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.4
Unweighted base 257 168 91 143 373 516
Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+
To summarise, using a scale from 0 “not at all likely” to 10 “extremely 
likely”, people give an average score of 4.4 for the chances that 
limiting their own energy use would reduce climate change; 5.8 for 
the chances that climate change would be reduced if large numbers 
of people reduced their energy use; 3.8 for the chances that large 
numbers of people will actually limit their energy use; and 4.3 for 
the chances that governments in enough countries will take action 
that reduces climate change. Overall people in Britain have some 
hope that climate change could be reduced, but they are not very 
confident that it will actually happen. 
Political divisions
In the following section we explore whether age and education 
divisions in climate change beliefs and concerns echo patterns of 
support for Brexit and for the political parties shown in the Voting 
chapter (Curtice and Simpson) and Europe chapter (Curtice and 
Tipping). Given that Leave voters had gradually moved towards the 
Conservatives and Remain voters to Labour by the time of the ESS in 
late 2016, a consequence of post-referendum politics in Britain may 
be that the parties have become divided on climate change. In this 
section we first consider the similarity between divisions over climate 
change and those over Brexit before turning to partisan divides. 
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Brexit
The ESS asked respondents how they voted in the June 2016 
referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union. Table 
12 below shows the climate change worry responses (explored 
earlier in Table 5) by whether people voted for the UK to leave or 
remain a member of the European Union. Those who voted leave 
are much less likely to be very or extremely worried about climate 
change (17%) than those who voted for the UK to remain (32%). This 
partly reflects a more fundamental divide with respect to belief in the 
existence of climate change. Some 71% of Remain voters think that 
climate change is definitely happening, compared with just 53% of 
Leave voters.
Table 12 Level of worry about climate change, by Brexit vote
All Remain Leave
Level of worry % % %
Extremely worried 6 6 4
Very worried 19 26 12
Somewhat worried 45 48 46
Not very worried 22 15 29
Not at all worried 6 3 7
Unweighted base 1858 679 692
Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+
Answer options are presented in the table in reverse order to how they were presented to 
respondents
Partisan divides
The ESS asked respondents if there was any political party they 
felt “closer to than all the others”, and if so which. Respondents 
were additionally asked which party they voted for at the last (2015) 
election. As a measure of which party they support we use the party 
they said they were closest to, if there was one, and, if not, the party 
voted for. This still leaves some 22% of those who neither voted in 
2015 nor felt closer to one party than any of the others. These people 
come under the category “None” in Table 13, and, based on previous 
research, can be considered disproportionately disinterested 
or disengaged with politics. This group, just like Conservative 
supporters (34%), are relatively more likely to say that they are not 
at all or not very worried about climate change (33%). However, in 
accordance with previous research (Carter and Clements, 2015), 
supporters of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) are the least 
worried, with 48% indicating that they are either not very or not at all 
worried. 
71% of Remain voters 
think that climate 
change is definitely 
happening, compared 
with just 53% of 
Leave voters
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Table 13 Level of worry about climate change, by party identification
Extremely 
worried
Very 
worried
Somewhat 
worried
Not very 
worried
Not at all 
worried
Unweighted 
base
All % 6 19 45 22 6 1858
Party 
identification
Conservative % 3 15 47 28 5 548
Labour % 6 23 48 17 4 512
Liberal 
Democrats
% 6 29 51 9 2 130
Scottish 
National Party
% 5 22 44 25 3 57
Green Party % 28 23 40 11 - 53
UKIP % 4 9 35 40 8 114
None % 6 17 42 23 10 414
Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+
Green party supporters are the most concerned, with 52% reporting 
to be very or extremely worried about climate change. Liberal 
Democrats are also clearly on the concerned side, with 35% saying 
that they are either very or extremely worried. Labour and Scottish 
National Party (SNP) supporters are more divided, and overall less 
worried than Greens and Liberal Democrats (though results for the 
SNP and Greens should be viewed with caution due to the small 
sample sizes involved).
Similar party differences are present in terms of the climate change 
beliefs discussed earlier (see Table 5). These are not merely a 
reflection of social differences in age, education and sex, as the 
effects remain after controlling for socio-demographic characteristics 
in a regression analysis (not shown). There are also party differences 
with regard to the questions on collective action. However, they 
follow a different pattern. For instance, Green party supporters have 
more confidence in the power of collective action than supporters 
of other parties, but are also more pessimistic than others about the 
prospects of large numbers of people actually limiting their energy 
use. Party differences are almost absent regarding the questions on 
personal energy saving efficacy and behaviour, with the exception 
that non-voters are less likely to save energy. Green party supporters 
are equally as likely as other party supporters to say that they often 
save energy, although they might be setting themselves higher 
standards as to what counts as “often”.
We cannot tell whether the differences we describe above are due to 
people with different attitudes to climate change choosing different 
parties, the influence of people’s preferred parties on the opinions of 
their supporters, or some combination. There are instances in British 
history when parties and their leaders provoked large-scale change 
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in the opinions of their supporters. By analysing BSA survey data, 
Curtice and Fisher (2003) showed that Blair moved the economic 
policy preferences of Labour party supporters to the right. But they 
also showed that Thatcher failed to achieve the same effect, within 
her party or more broadly, despite her efforts to do so. Since it is 
hard for leaders to change the public’s mind, and there has been 
remarkably little effort from mainstream politicians to exercise 
environmental leadership, we assume that individuals with different 
attitudes chose different parties. That does however not mean that 
they are necessarily choosing the party because of their opinion on 
climate change. With the exception of the Green party, it is more 
likely that people chose parties based on other considerations which 
happen to be correlated with climate change opinions. For instance, 
people increasingly choose between Labour and the Conservatives 
based on their attitudes to Brexit (Curtice, 2017), which, as we have 
seen above, are linked to attitudes to climate change. 
But while age, education and partisan divisions on climate change 
beliefs, concerns and policy preferences mirror the divisions on 
Brexit, the gaps are much smaller. Britain and the political parties are 
much more polarised on the issues most pertinent to the Brexit vote 
than they are on climate change policy.
Not only are the main partisan divisions on climate change beliefs 
and concerns relatively modest, but partisan divisions on climate 
change mitigation policy tend to be even smaller. There is little in 
the ESS to suggest that, for example, a Labour government would 
be pressured by their own voters for much stronger climate change 
mitigation policy than the Conservatives. Table 14 shows that 
support for climate change mitigation policies is only slightly higher 
for Labour voters than it is for Conservative voters, but not by much. 
There are no decisive differences indicating support for a policy 
among one party’s supporters but not another’s. For both parties, 
only a minority support more taxation of fossil fuels, and for both 
parties there is majority support for both renewable subsidies and a 
ban on inefficient appliances. 
Support for climate 
change mitigation 
policies is only 
slightly higher for 
Labour voters than for 
Conservative voters
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Table 14 Favourability of measures to reduce climate change, by party identification
Fossil fuel tax Renewable energy subsidies
Conservative Labour All Conservative Labour All
Level of favour % % % % % %
Strongly in favour 5 11 8 17 29 24
Somewhat in 
favour
30 31 28 51 43 44
Neither in favour 
nor against
22 23 25 15 13 17
Somewhat against 32 22 24 13 9 10
Strongly against 11 12 13 4 5 4
Unweighted base 548 512 1858 548 512 1858
Ban energy-inefficient household 
appliances
Conservative Labour All
Level of favour % % %
Strongly in favour 17 19 18
Somewhat in 
favour
45 39 38
Neither in favour 
nor against
16 22 21
Somewhat against 15 14 15
Strongly against 7 4 6
Unweighted base 548 512 1858
Source: European Social Survey wave 8 (2016), British respondents aged 18+
Nothing here suggests radically different internal policy pressures for 
Labour compared with the Conservatives. If a Labour-led government 
were to depend for parliamentary support on the Greens, Scottish 
National Party and the Liberal Democrats, the pressure for pro-
environmental policy from the government’s own supporters would 
be somewhat greater than with a majority Labour government. But 
still, environmental policies are relatively unimportant to all but the 
Greens and Liberal Democrats, and those are very small parties in 
terms of parliamentary seats. 
Conclusions
This chapter has shown that most people in Britain have given at 
least some thought to the issue of climate change, and also that 
most think it is definitely happening. Total scepticism about the 
existence of climate change is rare, as is the belief that climate 
change is entirely due to natural causes. But most do not think that 
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climate change is mainly caused by humans, and do not think the 
consequences will be very bad. The majority of people are only 
somewhat worried about it. In fact, people are rather less worried 
about climate change than they are about energy becoming too 
expensive. 
Accordingly, people are ambivalent about taxing energy from fossil 
fuels, which could clearly impose a cost on them. They are notionally 
supportive of subsidies for renewables and bans on energy inefficient 
appliances, although our survey questions did not point out that 
those policies would come at a cost. 
Overall, it appears that Britain is relatively relaxed about climate 
change, and not strongly divided over it. There are more worried than 
there are sceptical individuals, but the majority in Britain appears to 
have fairly middling attitudes towards climate change. They know 
about it, and acknowledge a human component, but are overall 
relatively indifferent and apathetic about climate change (Barasi, 
2017). 
Differences by age and education are reasonably strong and 
consistent when it comes to beliefs and concerns about climate 
change and what the government should do about it, but they do 
not extend to feelings of personal ability to make a difference or 
their own efforts to save energy. What divisions there are on other 
socio-demographic variables, such as sex, ethnicity, and income, are 
typically fairly weak and sporadic. 
There are, however, noticeable and consistent differences between 
supporters of different parties in how they think about climate 
change, as well as according to attitudes to Brexit. With this kind 
of survey we cannot properly assess if people are choosing their 
parties based on their attitudes to climate change, or whether parties 
are leading their voters towards certain views on climate change. It 
may also be that people are choosing parties more based on their 
attitudes to Brexit and related cultural issues, especially immigration. 
Opinion on those issues is correlated with attitudes to climate 
change. And so the Labour partisans are more climate-conscious 
than Conservatives, not necessarily because they chose their party 
based on environmental considerations, but more likely because their 
climate change attitudes go hand in hand with their Brexit and other 
attitudes. Although it was still on a modest scale, since late 2016 
and early 2017 when the ESS took place, at both the 2017 general 
election and in the 2018 local elections, we have seen swings from 
Labour to Conservative among Leave supporters and in the opposite 
direction among Remain voters (Curtice, 2018). Climate change may 
well become more of a partisan political football because of Brexit.
Most people do not think 
that climate change 
is mainly caused by 
humans or that the 
consequences will be 
very bad
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Appendix
The full question wording for the data presented in Table 4 is as 
follows:
How good or bad do you think the impact of climate change 
will be on people across the world? Please choose a number 
from 0 to 10, where 0 is extremely bad and 10 is extremely 
good.
(Answer scale from 0 = Extremely bad, to 10 = Extremely good)
The full question wording for the data presented in Table 6 is as 
follows:
To what extent do you feel a personal responsibility to try to 
reduce climate change?
(Answer scale from 0 = Not at all, to 10 = A great deal)
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